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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Several minimum wage variables have been suggested in the literature to estimate the eﬀect of
the minimum wage on employment. Among them, the “Kaitz index”, the real minimum wage,
the “fraction aﬀected”, the “fraction at” and the “fraction below”, described in detail below.1
Such a variety of variables makes it diﬃcult to compare the associated estimates across studies.
One problem is that these variables are not really comparable because the estimates using
diﬀerent minimum wage variables are not always calibrated to represent the eﬀect of a 10%
increase in the minimum wage on employment. The implicit assumption when using the “Kaitz
index” or the real minimum wage, for instance, is that minimum wage increases do not aﬀect
the average wages or overall price level substantially. If the variation in the ratio comes from
the variation in the nominal minimum wage, a 1% increase in the ratio is taken to represent a
1% increase in the nominal minimum wage. However, a 1% increase in the “fraction aﬀected”,
“fraction at” or “fraction below” variables cannot be taken to represent a 1% increase in the
nominal minimum wage. This is because the elasticities of these variables with respect to the
nominal minimum wage are not all -1. Lemos (2005) shows that comparing estimates before
calibration is misleading.
Another problem is that these variables are not really comparable because diﬀerent minimum
wage variables might simply measure the eﬀect of the minimum wage on diﬀerent groups of
workers. For example, while “fraction aﬀected” measures the costs of increasing the wages of
those just above the minimum wage, “fraction below” measures the costs of increasing the wages
of those below the minimum wage. Consequently, the magnitude of the employment eﬀect will
depend on whether there are more workers just above or below the minimum wage and to what
extent they are aﬀected. Or put diﬀerently, the magnitude of the employment eﬀect will depend
on the extent of wage spillover eﬀects just above and below the minimum wage. The magnitudes
of the estimates might not diﬀer much in a country where the fraction variables are small, such
as the US or the UK, for which most of the literature is available. However, the magnitude
of the estimates will substantially diﬀer in a country where a minimum wage increase aﬀects a
large fraction of workers above and below the minimum wage, and where the relative sizes of
these fractions diﬀer. For example, in Brazil there are more workers below the minimum wage
than between the old and new minimum wage. Thus, we might expect the estimates of “fraction
below” to be larger than the estimates of “fraction aﬀected”.
1The “Kaitz index” is the ratio of the minimum wage to average wages (Kaitz, 1970), the “fraction aﬀected”
is the proportion of workers aﬀected by a minimum wage increase (Card and Krueger, 1995), “fraction at” is the
proportion of workers earning the minimum wage (Dolado et al., 1996; Lemos, 2005), and “fraction below” is
the proportion of workers earning below the minimum wage (Dolado et al, 1996; Neumark et al, 2005). These
variables are described in detail below.
2Because of these two main problems, part of the recent controversy in the literature over the
magnitude, signiﬁcance and direction of the minimum wage employment eﬀect might be that
non-directly comparable estimates are being compared. For instance, Neumark and Wascher
(1992) found negative employment eﬀe c t sf o rt h eU Sw h e nu s i n gt h e“ K a i t zi n d e x ” ,w h i l eC a r d
and Krueger (1995) found non-signiﬁcant employment eﬀects for the US when using the “fraction
aﬀected” as their minimum wage variable.
In this paper we critically compare employment eﬀect estimates using the above ﬁve minimum
wage variables. The aim is to assess whether the estimates are sensitive to diﬀerent minimum
wage variables and whether this plays a role in the debate over the minimum wage employment
eﬀect. The data we use is from the Brazilian monthly household survey panel from 1982 to 2000.
Our principal ﬁnding is that the negative sign of the employment eﬀect is robust across min-
imum wage variables, but its magnitude and signiﬁcance are sensitive to the minimum wage
variable used. This is because diﬀerent minimum wage variables measure the eﬀect of the mini-
mum wage on diﬀerent groups of workers. We show that the estimates of minimum wage variables
that capture more wage spillover eﬀects are more negative and more robust. The remainder of
this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data, in Section 3 we deﬁne
and compare the various minimum wage variables, and in Section 4 we describe our empirical
approach. In Section 5 we address identiﬁcation issues and discuss our results. In Section 6 we
present robustness checks.
2 Data and Descriptive Analysis
The minimum wage in Brazil is national. The coverage of the minimum wage is full across regions
and individuals, though for some workers accommodation and food costs can be deducted from
their wages, resulting in below minimum wage pay. Informal sector workers and those in ﬁrms
where compliance is incomplete may also earn wages that are lower than the minimum wage.
The minimum wage data we use is from the Labour Ministry (Ministerio do Trabalho) and the
deﬂator is the CPI (IPC) across regions calculated by the Brazilian Institute of Statistics and
Geography (IBGE).
After its introduction in 1940, the real minimum wage was devalued before it was adjusted
during the boom of the 1950s. It then again declined during the subsequent recession. Since
the mid 1960s, when the dictatorship was installed in the country, the real minimum wage has
been systematically devalued because the government associated the then high inﬂation with
wage adjustments. The minimum wage continued to be devalued throughout the 1980s and most
3of the 1990s, despite the end of the dictatorship in the late 1980s. Since the mid 1990s, under
reasonably low inﬂation, the real minimum wage has been relatively stable. In Figure 1 we plot
the nominal and real minimum wage for Brazil between January 1982 and January 2000. The real
minimum wage clearly shows a negative trend in the period. Minimum wage increases during this
period were subject to the rules of ﬁve diﬀerent stabilization plans. The increases were large and
frequent, but quickly eroded by the subsequent inﬂation, resulting in the saw-toothed pattern in
Figure 1.
The other data we use is from the Brazilian Monthly Employment Survey (PME). The PME
is a rotating household panel similar to the US Current Population Survey (CPS). Households
are interviewed for four consecutive months, not interviewed for the following eight months, and
then interviewed again for four additional months. In the PME the panels are refreshed every two
years, rather than every year, as in the CPS. This data has been collected by the IBGE for the
six main Brazilian metropolitan regions (Salvador, Recife, Belo Horizonte, Rio de Janeiro, Sao
Paulo and Porto Alegre) since January of 1982. We aggregate the data across regions and across
months; the average number of observations per region-month cell was 13,000. In Table 1 we
present descriptive statistics for the variables we use in our empirical models below. The cross-
region variation in the data is considerable and we exploit this in order to identify the minimum
wage eﬀect on employment. For example, our employment variable, the employment rate, varies
from 0.83 to 0.98.2 In Figure 2 we show that the cross-time variation in the employment rate and
in our minimum wage variables is also substantial. The raw correlation between the employment
rate and the real minimum wage is 0.16 (correlations are reported for the national aggregate
unless otherwise stated).
3 Minimum Wage Variables
Our ﬁrst minimum wage variable is the real minimum wage, described above. Our second mini-
mum wage variable is the most common one in the literature, the “Kaitz index” (Kaitz, 1970),
deﬁned as the ratio of the minimum wage to average wage adjusted for coverage (coverage is
100% in Brazil). The variation in the “Kaitz index” across regions and time, shown in Table 1,
is from 0.11 to 0.57. This compares with the “Kaitz index” for the US and the UK, which was
0.39 and 0.40 in 1993 (Dolado et al., 1996). Figure 3 shows the variation in the “Kaitz index” in
the national aggregate over time. Its correlation with the real minimum wage is 0.81.
The next minimum wage variable we use is the “fraction aﬀected” by the minimum wage
2T h ee m p l o y m e n tr a t ei sd e ﬁned as Ne
N ,w h e r eN and Ne are the sample sizes of the labour force and working
population respectively.
4(Card, 1992), deﬁned as the fraction of workers aﬀected by a minimum wage increase, i.e. the
fraction of workers for whom wt−1 ∈ [wm
t−1,w m
t ],w h e r ewm is the nominal minimum wage and
w is nominal wages.3 “Fraction aﬀected” is zero whenever the minimum wage is constant.4
Whenever it is non-zero, its magnitude depends on the size of the increase and on the initial level
and shape of the wage distribution across regions. In Table 1 we show that “fraction aﬀected”
varies between 0% and 49%, with an average of 8% and a standard deviation of 12%. This
compares with the 7.4% “fraction aﬀected” in the US in 1990 (Card and Krueger, 1995). Figure
3s h o w s“ f r a c t i o na ﬀected” in the national aggregate over time. Its correlation with the real
minimum wage is 0.57.
A closely related variable is “fraction at” the minimum wage (Dolado et al., 1996), deﬁned
as the fraction of workers earning the minimum wage. “Fraction at” responds to minimum wage
increases; it is bigger after an increase and smaller as workers wage bargain (Card and Krueger,
1995). This is accentuated if inﬂation is high and the minimum wage is constant, as illustrated
in Figure 3. As a result, “fraction at” has more variation over time than “fraction aﬀected”,
which is reﬂected in its higher correlation with the real minimum wage, 0.64. In Table 1 we show
that “fraction at” is 12% on average, with a 6% standard deviation. This compares with the 4%
“fraction at” ﬁgure for the US in 1993 (Dolado et al., 1996).
Our ﬁfth minimum wage variable, related to the previous two, is “fraction below” the min-
imum wage (Dolado et al., 1996), deﬁned as the fraction of workers earning wages below the
minimum wage. This suggests that larger minimum wage increases trap more workers below
the minimum wage, and therefore “fraction below” also moves in response to minimum wage
increases. “Fraction below” varies between 1% and 43%, with an average of 12% and a standard
deviation of 9%. It has more variation over time than the previous two variables, as shown in
Figure 3. Its correlation with the real minimum wage is 0.71.
The above ﬁve variables are measures of the bite of the minimum wage. “Kaitz index” and the
real minimum wage itself, are “relative minimum wage measures”. The others are “degree of im-
pact measures” (Brown, 1999) because they focus on the fraction of workers directly aﬀected by
minimum wage increases: “fraction aﬀected” is a measure of the potential eﬀect of the increase,
“fraction at”, is a measure of the eﬀectiveness of the increase, and “fraction below” is a measure
of the non-compliance with the increase.
3In practice, for the case of Brazil, we deﬁne this interval as wt−1 ∈ [0.98wm
t−1,1.02wm
t ]. The bounds account
for measurement error introduced by rounding approximations. This is because in the presence of high inﬂation
as in Brazil, people tend to report rounded wages. All estimates in the paper were robust to deﬁning “fraction
aﬀected” with and without bounds (the correlation between the two is 0.91). Similarly, we deﬁne the interval for
“fraction at” as wt ∈ [0.98wm
t ,1.02wm
t ], and “fraction below” as wt ∈ [−∞,0.98wm
t ].
4That is because conceptually, no worker is aﬀected by a minimum wage increase when there is no increase.
53.1 Sources of Variation in the Minimum Wage Variables
“Relative minimum wage measures” are commonly used in empirical employment models because
they are grounded on the standard neoclassical model (Card and Krueger, 1995; Williams, 1993).
The implicit assumption is that the minimum wage varies across regions. If however the minimum
wage is national, as it is in Brazil, the numerator is constant and the variation in the ratio is driven
by the variation in the denominator. As a result, the eﬀect of the inverse of wages (or prices) on
employment is what is ultimately estimated in empirical models (Welch and Cunningham, 1978).
Although a national minimum wage is a diﬃculty when deﬁning “relative minimum wage
measures” empirically, it does make it possible to deﬁne “degree of impact measures”. This is
because the minimum wage aﬀects a diﬀerent proportion of people in each region, depending on
the initial level and shape of the wage distribution across regions. It can be argued that, as with
the “relative minimum wage measures”, the ultimate source of variation in the “degree of impact
measures” is the underlying wage distribution across regions. The advantage of the “degree of
impact measures” is that they capture variation at the point (interval) of the distribution that
really matters. Analysis based on the mean can be biased because they include people who are
not aﬀected by the minimum wage increase (Neri, 1997; Castillo-Freeman and Freeman, 1992).5
Furthermore, whereas an increase in the national minimum wage causes direct and immediate
variation in the “degree of impact measures”, it causes only indirect and lagged variation in
the “relative minimum wage measures”. This indirect variation, via average wages or prices,
may be contaminated by variation in variables other than the minimum wage. While neither
of these variables is immune to contamination by variation in other variables, Brown (1999,
p. 2130) concludes that the “degree of impact measures” are conceptually cleaner than the
“relative minimum wage measures”. Moreover, the “degree of impact measures” add variation
over and above the variation in the “relative wage measures” if inequality substantially varies
across regions, as it does in Brazil. Even if average wages are relatively unchanged following a
minimum wage increase, the variation in the “degree of impact measures” can be substantial if
the shape of the distribution is diﬀerent across regions.
Among the “degree of impact measures” the amount of variation diﬀers. Brown (1999, p.
2130) notes, “fraction aﬀected” is “not well-suited for studying periods when the minimum wage
is constant, and so its impact should be declining. While there is more to be learned from a
year in which the minimum wage increases by 10 or 15% more than average wages than from
a year of modest decline, the periods between increases should together contain about as much
5The “Kaitz index” could alternatively be deﬁned using the percentile of the wage distribution mostly aﬀected
by the increase. However, the aﬀected percentile varies across regions and over time, which makes the right choice
diﬃcult. In contrast, “degree of impact measures” are sensitive to the variation in the relevant percentile.
6information as the periods of increase.” That is because “fraction aﬀected” is zero regardless of
how unimportant the minimum wage may become. As a result, it does not capture the erosion
of the minimum wage relative to other wages. In contrast, “fraction at” varies even when the
minimum wage is constant. It measures both how binding the minimum wage is when increased
and how unimportant (not binding) the minimum wage is when not increased. Thus, “fraction
at” has more variation, and a stronger correlation with the real minimum wage (0.64) than
“fraction aﬀected” (0.57).
To establish whether the variation in “fraction at” is a measure of the variation in the min-
imum wage, consider three scenarios. Firstly, if the increase is fully anticipated, allowing wage
bargains which result in 100% spillovers (all workers keep their position in the wage distribu-
tion), “fraction at” is constant regardless of the size of the increase and therefore uncorrelated
with it. Secondly, if the increase is fully anticipated, but wage bargains result in less than 100%
spillovers, “fraction at” is correlated to the increase. The less spillovers there are, the stronger
the correlation. Third, if the increase is not anticipated, no wage bargains or spillovers occur and
all workers between the old and new minimum wage are squashed at the latter. “Fraction at”
is then strongly correlated with the increase. Therefore, the underlying identifying restrictions
for a valid control group are that a fully anticipated increase is not followed by 100% spillovers.
These are fairly realistic assumptions.
The variation in “fraction below” also depends on the extent of spillovers and anticipation
of the increase. It further depends on the extent of non-compliance, which depends on changes
in variables other than the minimum wage. As a result, “fraction at” is a cleaner measure
of the minimum wage eﬀect, although “fraction below” has a stronger correlation with the real
minimum wage (0.71). We use each of the above minimum wage variables in turn in our empirical
employment model below and compare their estimates.
4E m p l o y m e n t E ﬀects
4.1 Model Speciﬁcation
A simple empirical employment equation standard in the literature (Brown, 1999) is:
∆lnNrt = α + β
M∆lnWM
rt + λ∆Xrt + fr + ft +  rt (1)
where Nrt is the employment rate, WM
rt is the real minimum wage, Xrt are labour supply shifters,
7fr and ft are region and time ﬁxed eﬀects, and  rt is the error term in region r and month t,
r =1 ,...,6,a n dt =1 ,...,214. Regional dummies model region growth speciﬁc trends. Supply
shifters are the proportion of the total population who are younger than 10 years old, between 10
and 24 years of age, women, illiterates, retirees, students, in urban areas, with completed basic
education (8 years) and high school education (11 years); the average years of schooling in the
total population; the proportion of the working population holding two jobs, in the informal,
public, construction and metallurgy sectors. A GLS correction is performed in all models in the
paper to correct for heteroskedasticity arising from aggregation and to account for the relative




M estimates, shown in row 1 and column 1 of Table 2, are statistically insigniﬁcant. The
estimates are again statistically insigniﬁcant when we replace the real minimum wage in Equation
1 by the “Kaitz index”, as shown in row 1 and column 2 of Table 2. Thus, the results when
using the “relative minimum wage measures” suggest that the minimum wage does not have an
adverse employment eﬀect in Brazil. However, when we replace the log of the real minimum
wage in Equation 1 by the “fraction aﬀected”, “fraction at” and “fraction below” in turn, the
estimates are negative and signiﬁcant, as shown in row 1 and column 3 to 5 of Table 2. Thus,
the results when using the “degree of impact measures” suggest that the minimum wage has an
adverse employment eﬀect in Brazil.
The implicit assumption when using “relative minimum wage measures” is that minimum
wage increases do not aﬀect the overall price level or average wages substantially. If the variation
in the ratio comes from the variation in the nominal minimum wage, a 1% increase in the ratio
is taken to represent a 1% increase in the nominal minimum wage. Even assuming no wage
spillovers eﬀects and no inﬂationary eﬀects, a 1% increase in the “degree of impact measures”
cannot be taken to represent a 1% increase in the nominal minimum wage. That is because the
elasticities of the various “degree of impact measures” with respect to the nominal minimum wage
are not all -1. For example, in Section 4.3 we estimate the elasticity of the “fraction aﬀected”
with respect to the nominal minimum wage, which is 0.37. The “fraction at” elasticity is 0.06,
and the “fraction below” elasticity is 0.07.
We use these elasticities to calibrate our “degree of impact measures” estimates to reﬂect the
6The GLS estimates were robust to GMM estimation using lags of the minimum wage variable as well as a
number of political variables as instruments (Lemos, 2004). This suggests that any endogeneity bias arising from
the simultaneous determination of “fraction at” and employment is not too severe.
8eﬀect of a 1% increase in the minimum wage, in a similar fashion to Card and Krueger (1995,
p. 142). For instance, before calibration, a 1 percentage point increase in “fraction aﬀected”
decreases employment by 0.045%, as shown in row 1 and column 3 of Table 2. Card and Krueger
(1995, p. 144) found estimates ranging from 0.03 to 0.36, not always signiﬁcant, when regressing
the change of employment-population ratio on the “fraction aﬀected” for the US. Our estimate is
more negative because of more extensive wage spillovers in Brazil (Lemos 2005; Fajnzylber, 2001).
After calibration, a 1% increase in the nominal minimum wage (increases “fraction aﬀected” by
0.37 percentage points) decreases employment by 0.017%, as shown in row 2 of Table 2.
While the estimate of “fraction aﬀected” is -0.017, the estimate of “fraction at” is -0.006. The
former is larger because “fraction aﬀected” embraces a larger proportion of workers and therefore
measures higher extra wage costs (wage spillovers just above the minimum wage). The estimate
of “fraction below” is -0.008, which is also larger than the estimate of “fraction at” because
“fraction below” also embraces a larger proportion of workers and therefore also measures higher
extra wage costs (wage spillovers below the minimum wage). Furthermore, the “fraction aﬀected”
estimate is larger than the “fraction below” estimate, suggesting that the spillovers just above
the minimum wage are larger than the spillovers below the minimum wage.
4.3 Calibration Method
The main drawback with the interpretation of the estimates above is that it is completely reliant
on the robustness of the elasticity estimates used to calibrate the raw “degree of impact measures”
estimates. The issue arises when extending the calibration method used by Card and Krueger
(1995, p. 142) to the context of multiple time series over regions. Card and Krueger (1995)
calculate the change in the “fraction aﬀected” following the 1990-1991 nominal minimum wage
increase and use this ﬁgure to calibrate their “fraction aﬀected” estimates. As we have several
nominal minimum wage increases, the analogue here is to regress “fraction aﬀected” on the
diﬀerence of log nominal minimum wage and the other regressors in Equation 1 (Lemos, 2005):7
Frt = a + b∆lnwm
t + c∆Xrt + gr + gt + ert (2)
where Frt is “fraction aﬀected”, wm
t is the nominal minimum wage as deﬁned earlier, gr and
gt are region and time ﬁxed eﬀects, and ert is the error term. However, because the nominal
7Lemos (2005) uses a deterministic model to give the intuition. Let y = a1+b1x, y = a2+b2z,a n dz = a3+b3x;
then b1 = b2b3, ∀ b1,b 2,b 3 6=0 . In non-deterministic models, the more precise the estimates are, the better b1
approximates b2b3. This is equivalent to using the nominal minimum wage as an instrument for the “fraction
aﬀected”. The reduced form equation is obtained by substituting Equation (2) into Equation (1).
9minimum wage does not vary across regions, b is not identiﬁed in Equation 2. We thus replace the
nominal minimum wage in Equation 2 by the “Kaitz index” and obtain an estimate of 0.37 with
standard errors of 0.05. This is the elasticity we use above to calibrate our “fraction aﬀected”
estimates. The 0.06 “fraction at” elasticity with standard errors of 0.30, and the 0.07 “fraction
below” elasticity with standard errors of 0.33 were obtained in a similar manner. As we discussed
in Section 3.1, our main concern is that the 0.37 estimate does not fully identify the eﬀect of the
minimum wage on “fraction aﬀected” because the variation in the “Kaitz index” is driven by the
variation in average wages.
5I d e n t i ﬁcation
Without a robust and fully identiﬁed estimate of the “fraction aﬀected” elasticity to calibrate the
raw estimate of “fraction aﬀected” from Equation 1, the interpretation of this raw estimate is not
straightforward. This is because the raw estimate is informative of the change in employment
given a change in the proportion of workers aﬀected by the minimum wage increase but not given
a change in the minimum wage itself, which is the relevant policy variable. Another way to use
the “fraction aﬀected” to measure the impact of a national minimum wage is to interact the two.
This gives a weighted minimum wage, where the impact of a national minimum wage increase
in each region is measured by the proportion of workers directly aﬀected by the increase in that
region. This is a more intuitive and more policy relevant minimum wage variable. Thus, we
modify Equation 1 in the following way:




t + λ∆Xrt + fr + ft + urt (3)
where β is the coeﬃcient of interest and urt is the new error term. Although β
M is not identiﬁed,
the eﬀect of the nominal minimum wage is controlled for in the model because it is expanded
out in the time eﬀects and thus the other coeﬃcients in the equation are adequately estimated.
Thus, we interpret the β coeﬃcient as deviations from the mean eﬀect that would have been
captured by β
M, but instead is captured by the time eﬀects. We estimate Equation 3 taking Frt
to mean in turn “fraction aﬀected”, “fraction at” and “fraction below”.
The results when using “fraction aﬀected”, shown in row 3 of Table 2, indicate that a 1%
increase in the weighted nominal minimum wage decreases employment by 0.024%. As before,
this eﬀect is smaller when using “fraction at” and larger when using “fraction below”, as shown in
row 3 of Table 2. This is because the last two account for wage spillover eﬀects. These results now
10suggest that spillovers below the minimum wage are larger than spillovers just above it. Table
1c o n ﬁrms that “fraction below” is larger than “fraction aﬀected”. Our results indicate that
increasing the wages of those at the minimum wage by 1% does not adversely aﬀect employment,
as the “fraction at” estimates are not signiﬁcant. However, increasing the wages of those below
the minimum wage by 1% decreases employment by 0.037%, while increasing the wages of those
just above the minimum wage by 1% decreases employment by 0.024%.
5.1 Robustness Checks
A potential criticism with the speciﬁcation of Equation 3 is that the change in the nominal
minimum wage is zero when the nominal minimum wage is held constant. Thus, the interaction
term is zero not only when using “fraction aﬀected”, as discussed in Section 3.1, but also when
using “fraction at” and “fraction below”. As a result, we fail to exploit the variation in the
last two variables associated to the erosion of the minimum wage relative to other wages. We
check the robustness of our results to this criticism by modifying our estimation strategy in two
diﬀerent ways. Firstly, we restrict the analysis to time periods in which there was an increase
in the minimum wage by dropping the time periods in which the interaction term is zero. The
estimates are now larger, as shown in row 4 of Table 2, although they follow the same pattern of
signs, signiﬁcance and relative magnitudes.
Secondly, in order to capture the erosion of the minimum wage in relation to other wages and
prices, we replace the nominal minimum wage in Equation 3 by the real minimum wage. We
again interpret the β coeﬃcient as deviations from annual means. That is because, as before,
the mean minimum wage eﬀect that would be captured by β
M is instead captured by the time
eﬀects, and β
M simply captures the eﬀect of the inverse of prices on employment. The estimate
of “fraction aﬀected” is as large as it was when using the nominal minimum wage and a full
sample (row 3), and the “fraction below” estimate is roughly the same size as when using the
nominal minimum wage and a restricted sample (row 4). The estimate of “fraction at” remains
insigniﬁcant, as shown in row 5 of Table 2. Neumark et al. (2003) estimated a similar model
in which, however, the real minimum wage is interacted with a dummy for low and high wage
regions. The estimate of the interaction term in their most complete speciﬁcation is a signiﬁcant
-0.024, which is remarkably in line with our results above. Our model is arguably superior to
theirs because Frt has variation over and above their dummy. Frt varies across regions and over
time and is thus a better measure of the intensity of the increase across regions. Furthermore,
our model is less prone to omitted variable bias.
Our ﬁnal robustness check is to allow for lagged employment responses to minimum wage
11increases. The usual justiﬁcations in the literature for omitting dynamics are that the high vol-
untary turnover in low wage occupations allows adjustment in employment via non-replacement
rather than via ﬁring; and that the announcement of minimum wage increases prior to the en-
actment date allows anticipated adjustment in employment (Brown, 1999). As employment is
usually reported to be AR(2) in the literature, we allow two years for full adjustment by adding
24 lags of the dependent variable in Equation 3. We ﬁnd that our results are robust to this
speciﬁcation change. The estimate of “fraction below” is roughly the same and the estimate
of “fraction at” remains insigniﬁcant, as shown in row 6 of Table 2. The estimate of “fraction
aﬀected” is now a bit larger. The long run estimates are not signiﬁcant, conﬁrming that em-
ployment adjusts fairly quickly following minimum wage increases. When allowing for dynamics,
Neumark et al. (2003) also found insigniﬁcant eﬀe c t si nt h el o n gr u ni nB r a z i l ,w i t ht h es h o r t
run estimate changing little in magnitude, -0.27, but becoming insigniﬁcant.
5.2 Discussion
Our results suggest that the sign of the employment eﬀect is robust across various alternative
minimum wage variables and identiﬁcation strategies. As the correlation between each of the
minimum wage variables and the real minimum wage is positive, this is in line with our prior
expectation that the estimates should carry the same sign. However, the magnitude and signiﬁ-
cance of this eﬀect are sensitive to both the minimum wage variable used and the identiﬁcation
strategy exploited. We argue that is because diﬀerent minimum wage variables measure the eﬀect
of the minimum wage on diﬀerent groups of workers. The more spillovers the variable measures,
the larger the estimates are. For example, the estimates of “fraction below” are the largest, as
they account for spillovers below the minimum wage, followed by the estimates of “fraction af-
fected”, which account for more limited spillovers just above the minimum wage. The estimates
of “fraction at”, which account for no spillover eﬀects, are the smallest — insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero.
We expected the estimates of the “Kaitz index” to be the largest and most negative one,
because this variable accounts for spillovers throughout the entire wage distribution. Similarly,
we expected the estimates of the real minimum wage to be large and negative, because it accounts
for overall wage-price spillovers. However, none of these estimates is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. Neumark et al. (2003) also found statistically insigniﬁcant real minimum wage estimates
when estimating a similar model for Brazil. Williams (1993) estimated a similar speciﬁcation
for the US using the “Kaitz index” and the real minimum wage in turn, but found negative and
signiﬁcant estimates, respectively -0.182 and -0.325. Neumark and Washer (1992) also estimated
12a similar model for the US and found “Kaitz index” estimates ranging from -0.18 to 0.06, not
always signiﬁcant. As we discussed in Section 3.1, the “relative minimum wage measures” do not
fully identify the eﬀect of the minimum wage on employment and thus we broadly dismiss these
results, which were here reported for completeness and comparability with the literature.
Our results of up to -0.05 are small when compared to the -0.1 employment eﬀect in the
literature for other developed and developing countries (Brown, 1999; Maloney and Mendez,
2004). However, our results are in line with previous evidence for Brazil. Lemos (2005) and
Neumark et al. (2003) estimated similar speciﬁcations for Brazil and found estimates in line with
the above,8 although Fajnzylber (2001) indirectly derived employment eﬀect estimates from their
wage eﬀect estimates and found a larger -0.1 estimate (the associated standard errors were not
reported).
6 Further Robustness Checks
We investigate further why our estimates are small by restricting our sample to low wage workers
and to low inﬂation periods, in turn. Firstly, the motivation to restrict our sample to low
wage workers is that our earlier estimates are for the entire working population, which might be
diluting more adverse employment eﬀects for low wage workers (Stewart, 2002). We thus estimate
Equation 3 for two groups of low wage workers in turn: teenagers (between 15 and 19 years of
age), as it is usual in the US minimum wage literature (Brown, 1999), and low educated workers
(those with 4 or less years of schooling). The estimates for teenagers, shown in row 7 of Table
2, are insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, indicating that the minimum wage does not adversely
aﬀect teenage employment. These estimates are in line with recent evidence for US teenagers,
where no adverse eﬀects on employment have been documented (Card and Krueger, 1995). For
the low wage workers, the “fraction at” and the “fraction aﬀected” estimates remain statistically
insigniﬁcant, as shown in row 8 of Table 2. The “fraction below” estimate is signiﬁcant, suggesting
that a 1% increase in the wages of those below the minimum wage decreases low wage workers
employment by 0.069%. Thus, it appears that by increasing the wages of the lowest paid (those
below the minimum wage) some of them will loose their jobs. This suggests that some of the
poorest beneﬁt least from the legislation.
Secondly, the motivation to restrict our sample to low inﬂation periods is that our earlier
estimates are for the full sample period, which might be diluting more adverse employment
8Employment can be adjusted in two margins following a minimum wage increase: the number of posts of jobs
and the number of hours of work. Recent research (Card and Krueger, 2000; Neumark and Wascher, 2000; Machin
et al., 2003) suggests that small employment (rate) eﬀects are a sub-product of adjustments in hours. Neumark
et al. (2003) and Lemos (2005) estimated hours eﬀect for Brazil and found little evidence of an adverse eﬀect.
13eﬀects in low inﬂation periods. This is because ﬁrms might respond diﬀerently to a minimum
wage increase depending on the level of inﬂation. In high inﬂation periods, ﬁrms may perceive
the increase as temporary, anticipating the subsequent accommodating monetary policy and
wage-price spiral. Hence they would not adjust employment to avoid adjustment costs (Cox and
Oaxaca, 1981). Conversely, more adverse employment eﬀects might be expected in low inﬂation
periods. We thus estimate Equation 3 restricting our sample to the period after July of 1994,
when inﬂation was brought under control. These estimates, shown in row 9 of Table 2, are
insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, indicating, that the minimum wage does not adversely aﬀect
employment even in low inﬂation.
7C o n c l u s i o n
The main goal in this paper was to assess whether estimates of the minimum wage employment
eﬀect are sensitive to diﬀerent minimum wage variables and whether this plays a role in the recent
debate over the minimum wage employment eﬀect in the literature. The above estimates suggest
that while the sign of the estimates is not sensitive, the magnitude and signiﬁcance are. Even
after calibrating the estimates of diﬀerent minimum wage variables to represent the eﬀect of a
10% increase in the minimum wage on employment, the estimates were not comparable. That is
b e c a u s et h e ym e a s u r et h ee ﬀect of minimum wage increases on diﬀerent groups of workers. The
more spillovers the minimum wage variable measured, the larger the employment eﬀect was. For
example, using the estimates of our preferred speciﬁcation, increasing the wages of those at the
minimum wage by 1% does not adversely aﬀect employment. However, increasing the wages of
those below the minimum wage by 1% decreases employment by 0.050%, while increasing the
wages of those just above the minimum wage by 1% decreases employment by 0.024%. Thus, the
estimates of “fraction below” are the largest, as they account for spillovers below the minimum
wage, followed by the estimates of “fraction aﬀected”, which account for more limited spillovers
just above the minimum wage. The estimates of “fraction at”, which account for no spillover
eﬀects, are insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
This is a small eﬀe c tw h e nc o m p a r e dw i t ht h e- 0 . 1e m p l o y m e n te ﬀect in the literature for other
developed and developing countries, although it is in line with previous evidence for Brazil. This
result was robust to various alternative identiﬁcation strategies and minimum wage variables.
The employment eﬀect estimates remained small when we restricted our analysis to vulnerable
groups such as teenagers and low wage workers. A fruitful avenue for future research is to
compare estimates of diﬀerent minimum wage variables using data for other developing and
14developed countries to test the robustness of our ﬁndings. The main policy implication deriving
from these results is that the minimum wage does not destroy too many jobs in Brazil.
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Figure 1 - THE NOMINAL AND REAL MINIMUM WAGE IN BRAZIL, 1982-2000























Figure 2 - THE EMPLOYMENT RATE IN BRAZIL, 1982-2000

































































































Figure 3 - MINIMUM WAGE VARIABLES IN BRAZIL, 1982-2000
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Table 1 - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS                                                       
Variables average standard minimum maximum
deviation
employment rate 0.92 0.03 0.83 0.98
nominal minimum wage 35.87 52.66 0.01 136.00
real minimum wage 149.52 37.89 70.33 289.53
average real earnings 569.47 163.55 266.25 1492.10
"Kaitz index" 0.26 0.07 0.11 0.57
"Kaitz index 50" 0.50 0.15 0.19 0.95
"fraction affected" 0.08 0.12 0.00 0.49
"fraction at" 0.12 0.06 0.01 0.29
"fraction below" 0.12 0.09 0.01 0.43
Percentage of Workers
metallurgic industry 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.26
building construction 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.08
commerce 0.09 0.01 0.07 0.11
services 0.29 0.02 0.20 0.34
public sector  0.07 0.01 0.02 0.10
informal sector 0.31 0.06 0.17 0.44
Percentage of Population
aged 10 to 24 years old 0.42 0.05 0.32 0.52
aged 25 to 64 years old 0.51 0.04 0.41 0.59
aged over 65 years old 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.13
women 0.45 0.02 0.40 0.49
student 0.25 0.05 0.17 0.37
enrolled in schooling 0.33 0.05 0.24 0.44
literate 0.92 0.04 0.80 0.97
elementary education   (8 years of schooling) 0.39 0.06 0.27 0.51
secondary education  (11 years of schooling) 0.14 0.03 0.08 0.24
graduates 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.14
retired 0.12 0.03 0.06 0.20
in urban areas 0.96 0.03 0.87 1.00
(1) These are averages over 6 regions and 214 months.  The sample size before aggregation is 21,014,787 observations.








Table 2 - ESTIMATES OF THE COEFFICIENT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE VARIABLE ON EMPLOYMENT MODELS
Real minimum wage Kaitz Fraction affected Fraction at Fraction below
coefficient st. error coefficient st. error coefficient st. error coefficient st. error coefficient st. error
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) Raw coefficients -0.073 0.053 -0.003 0.013 -0.045 0.011 -0.099 0.016 -0.118 0.013
(2) Calibrated coefficients -0.017 0.004 -0.006 0.001 -0.008 0.001
(3) Weighted nominal minimum wage coefficients -0.024 0.012 -0.014 0.016 -0.037 0.016
(4) Periods with nominal minimum wage increase coefficients -0.034 0.016 -0.036 0.023 -0.048 0.021
(5) Weighted real minimum wage coefficients -0.024 0.011 -0.035 0.022 -0.050 0.020
(6) Weighted real minimum wage coefficients with dynamics -0.041 0.018 -0.038 0.023 -0.049 0.021
      long run coefficient -0.019 0.019 -0.018 0.021 -0.023 0.021
(7) Teenagers (weighted real minimum wage coefficients) -0.030 0.059 -0.045 0.076 -0.096 0.067
(8) Low educated (weighted real minimum wage coefficients) -0.018 0.021 -0.045 0.028 -0.069 0.025
(9) Low inflation (weighted real minimum wage coefficients) -0.030 0.144 -0.074 0.080 -0.010 0.109
(a) These are GLS estimates where the weights are the square root of the inverse of the sample size. Standard errors (shown underneath the estimates) are White-corrected 
       and serial correlation corrected across and within regions.
(b) The dependent variable is employment rate and the independent variable of interest is, in turn, the several minimum wage variables indicated in the table.
(c) Time effects are modeled with month dummies, region effects are modeled with region dummies, and labor supply shifters are included as controls.
(d) In row 2 the estimates in row 1 are calibrated to reflect a 1% increase in the minimum wage.  "Fraction affected” estimates are multiplied by 0.37, which is the approximate 
       elasticity of the minimum wage with respect to “fraction at”.  Similarly, the "fraction at" estimates are multiplied by 0.06, and the "fraction below" estimates, by 0.07.  